By: Todd Smith
Albania rarely features in discussions of European espionage. That absence should not be read as reassurance. Recent evidence suggests that smaller, open political systems may be more exposed to modern intelligence activity than the larger powers that dominate headlines.
A comprehensive European security study, Spies Among Us: Espionage in Europe, charts how espionage across the continent has evolved since 2008. The findings challenge familiar assumptions. Intelligence services today are less focused on stealing military secrets than on understanding political systems from the inside. Their interest lies in access, influence, and anticipation. By those criteria, Tirana is not peripheral but convenient.
Across Europe, political intelligence has become as valuable as classified material. Information about coalition dynamics, policy drafts, internal disagreements, and informal power brokers allows foreign actors to shape outcomes before decisions are finalised. Albania’s political culture, highly centralised and reliant on personal networks, lends itself to this kind of scrutiny. In Tirana, proximity to power often matters more than formal authority.
The notion that espionage targets only large or wealthy states is contradicted by the evidence. Intelligence services pursue leverage, not prestige. Albania’s NATO membership, aspirations to join the European Union, role in regional security, and involvement in infrastructure and energy projects all increase its strategic relevance. Smaller states can be easier to observe, cheaper to penetrate, and slower to detect influence operations. That combination is attractive.
Perhaps the most revealing aspect of modern espionage is how unremarkable many of its participants appear. The study documents a shift towards recruiting individuals with access rather than rank. Political aides, consultants, journalists, IT contractors, translators, and researchers are increasingly useful sources. They often lack security clearance and do not see themselves as sensitive targets. Their value lies in context, continuity, and interpretation. Much of what they provide seems innocuous in isolation.
Tirana’s political ecosystem amplifies this vulnerability. The overlap between politics, media, civil society, and business ensures that sensitive information circulates informally and digitally. This reduces the need for clandestine collection. Observation, documentation, and selective engagement are often sufficient. The boundary between political networking and intelligence gathering becomes indistinct.
Digital exposure further lowers the barriers. Social media platforms and encrypted messaging services are now routine tools for identifying and assessing potential sources. Albania’s political class is highly visible online and often careless with communications. Weak cybersecurity practices and a culture of constant disclosure turn political life into a form of open-source intelligence. In such an environment, espionage can be conducted quietly and at low cost.
Albania’s principal weakness is not institutional failure but conceptual lag. Counterintelligence is still treated as the domain of specialised agencies rather than a shared responsibility of governance. Security awareness rarely extends to political staff, advisors, or contractors, despite their proximity to decision-making. Transparency rules exist but are unevenly enforced. Digital security is treated as technical hygiene rather than political infrastructure.
Addressing these vulnerabilities does not require secrecy or repression. It requires competence. Political leaders and senior officials must recognise that influence awareness is now a basic function of statecraft. Security training should reflect how intelligence is actually gathered. Transparency rules on foreign funding, lobbying, and conflicts of interest must be enforced consistently. Digital discipline should be regarded as a professional obligation.
